The Moral Trial: Economists and the Socratic Problem by Alessandro Lanteri






































ABSTRACT [100 words]. Most people believe economists are more selfish than non-
economists. The reasons for such belief and for the related moral condemnation of 
economists remain confused. Both charges and evidence are insufficient to support 
substantial judgements. Further elaboration would be welcome before drawing 
implications from the current charge (i.e. economists are more selfish than non-
economists), further investigations into the causes of this phenomenon (self-selection or 
training) are required for blaming economists and suggesting corrections, and further 
evidence needs be gathered to sustain the charges. Alternative explanations (beyond self-
selection and training) are also suggested, which might lead to different implications, 
charges, and corrections. 
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The discipline of economics is very young.  If we accept the prevalent account by which it 
was born sometimes in the 18
th Century – tentatively with the moral philosopher Adam 
Smith and the thinkers who inspired him – it is less than 300 years old, an age which by 
the standards of the development of human knowledge might confidently suggest that it is 
still in its infancy.  (Yet very fast it has been growing.)  A unique phenomenon, compared 
with other disciplines, is that economics is not an only child.  It was born almost 
simultaneously with its nemesis: anti-economics. 
Anti-economics, as defined by its historian William Coleman (2004, p. 7), is “one of the 
western world’s more prominent demonologies of the intellect” and “an anti-economist is 
whoever sees economics as a bane.  To the anti-economist the offence of economics is that 
it is harmful, it is pernicious.  The world would be much better without it.” Therefore the 
agenda “is not to criticise economics endlessly, but to dispense with it altogether” (Kanth 
1997, quoted in Coleman 2004, p. 8n).  Economic theory has been variously attacked as 
false, useless, or harmful; the practice of economics has been dubbed methodologically 
inadequate, conceited, biased, o r bidden; and the subject of economics considered 
overstretched in scope or overemphasised in value.  Despite some isolated reactions, 
economists largely ignored anti-economics.  “It is an ocean whose wild swell has been 
shrugged off, and whose depths have been left unexplored,” Coleman (p. 5) forcefully 
comments. 
Though the program of anti-economics, in all its varied forms, was perhaps set to a failure 
(ibid., ch.14), more pointed and constructive criticism has often succeeded in improving 
economics – a result anti-economists do not wish for.  One recent chapter in the hopefully 
constructive criticism of economics dates around the early ’90s, when we started 
investigating whether economists are more selfish than non-economists.  The prevailing 
belief is that we are.  And that we are right from the beginning of our career because 
selfish people self-select themselves into Econ 101, though it is sometimes conceded that 
training in economics contributes to making us yet more selfish over time.  We thus have 
one charge: economists are more selfish than non-economists; and two indicted: 
economists and economics.
1  We also often hear calls for correction: we must change the 
teaching of economics.  In other words, this discussion resembles a trial. 
                                                 
1 I only quickly touch upon the connection between the two below, because it mirrors the relationship 
between individual and collective (moral) responsibility, and the issue is problematic in a several ways.   2 
On this matter I do not aspire to be the judge, nor an attorney on behalf of either side.  As a 
young economics teacher, I am involved first-hand in the matter and I am probably biased.  
I shall then content myself with playing the devil’s advocate and, in the light of the 
piecemeal and sometimes contradicting evidence gathered so far, I suggest the trial is 
inconclusive.  I also propose that additional charges, additional evidence, and additional 
implications are worth investigating to obtain a more complete picture of the phenomenon 
before calling for correction. 
 
1. A TRIAL IN ECONOMICS 
Between 1979 and 1981, the psychologists Gerald Marwell, Ruth Ames and Geraldine 
Alfano published the results of their extensive experimental testing of the, back then 
fashionable, economic hypothesis of free riding.  The idea (Olson 1965, Hardin 1968) is 
that, when faced with the choice to invest in a good or service whose benefits are available 
to everyone regardless of who actually contributes to it (i.e. a public good), people will not 
voluntarily open their wallet.  The public good is thus not provided (strong free riding) or 
provided in suboptimal quantities (weak free riding).  The economic rationale for this 
outcome is that self-interested agents find it more advantageous to let someone else pay the 
bill for a good they consume anyway.  Marwell and Ames (1981, p. 1) believed such claim 
to rest “on the strength of theoretical argument […] rather than rigorous empirical test.” 
Nobody was impressed by their experimental findings that there exists no strong free 
riding, but only some form of weak free riding.  The criticism that our discipline is in 
conflict with empirical observations does not worry economists very much.  In the 80’s 
economists (believed we) knew how to respond to criticism of this kind.  Since the times of 
the father of homo economicus, John Stuart Mill, it has been widely believed “seldom in 
our power to make experiments in [moral sciences]” (Mill 1844, p. 146) and to arrive at 
truth via observation of facts ‘vain hope.’  The method of economics had to be a priori 
abstract speculation with a posteriori verification of one’s predictions.  Invoking Milton 
Friedman’s (1953, p. 31) super-influential methodological essay, we also believed that all 
criticism against rationally self-interested agency (i.e. homo economicus), which underpins 
the predictions of free-riding, “is based on supposedly directly perceived discrepancies 
between the ‘assumptions’ and the ‘real world’.”
2  Such criticism “is largely beside the 
                                                 
2 For a criticism of resorting to Friedman (1953) to justify just about any methodological choice in 
economics, see Mäki (2003).   3 
point unless s upplemented by evidence that a hypothesis differing in one or another 
[respect …] yields better predictions.”  But Marwell and Ames (1981, p. 308) admit they 
“do not have a clear basis on which to suggest some alternative theoretical approach that 
might account for these results.” 
The first and most apparent problem, namely that economics is at odds with empirical 
results, remains disregarded in the literature covered here. 
 
1.1. THE TRIAL TURNS MORAL 
It is another problem that made it to the headlines.  An altogether different reaction was 
indeed reserved to the observation that not every free rider is equally weak.  Among a large 
sample of students, those who behaved closest to the predictions of economic theory were 
graduate students of economics. 
Thus, J ohn Carter and Michael Irons (1991) set to investigate the robustness and the 
origins of the behavioural difference between economists and non-economists.  They 
conclude that some students behave more selfishly than others, because they are 
particularly concerned with economic incentives to begin with, so they choose to study 
economics (i.e. the phenomenon is explained by self-selection).  Robert Frank, Thomas 
Gilovich and Dennis Regan (1993) elaborated this point inquiring whether such difference 
is explained only by  a priori self-selection of selfish people into economics or the 
exposure to economic ideas also plays some causal role, and found that studying 
economics has some influence (i.e. the phenomenon is explained by training). 
These and other similar findings show that, when economists play game-theoretical 
experiments, we do not play like everyone else:  our conduct is distinctively ‘economic,’ 
while the conduct of others is ‘non-economic.’  But are these findings part of our subject 
matter?  Is this economics?  Do such investigations clarify any aspect of the production, 
distribution, and consumption of goods and services?  Or do they explore the ways in 
which rational individuals make decisions on the allocation of scarce resources that have 
alternative uses?  They don’t.  So, why bother? 
Admittedly this can be regarded as a topic to be addressed under the rubric of Teaching of 
Economics or the A2 category in the JEL classification system.
3  Unfortunately most 
contributions to the debate do not report their classification and do not provide useful 
                                                 
3 Some early papers on this theme (Scott and Roman 1975, Soper and Walstad 1983, Frey et al. 1993) were 
published in the Journal of Economic Education.   4 
evidence.  Bruno Frey and Stephen Meier (2000) do in fact mention A2, but they also refer 
to A13, namely the Relation of Economics to Social Values, which obviously calls to mind 
ethical concerns.  And rightly so. 
The issue at hand concerns the relationship between individual behaviour and collective 
consequences, a topic through which economics spun-off from moral philosophy three 
centuries ago.  In the original formulations, selfish individual conduct resulted in social 
prosperity.  One may find not many ethical troubles with such result.  Game theoretical 
investigations of the kind employed in the experiments with economists, on the other hand, 
cover those situations in which individually sensible behaviour brings about collective 
failures.  If economics cannot find the proper balance of incentives to overcome such 
failures, the theme legitimately falls back within the scope of ethics. 
It is apparent that the ‘moral trial’ interpretation of these experiments is the most 
promising.  And one does not even have to dig very deep to come across evidence 
supportive of such interpretation, but simply judge, so to speak, the paper by its title.  
Economists are known for exceptionally sober prose, betraying a determinate attempt at 
establishing ourselves as rigorous (capital-s) Scientists while distancing ourselves from the 
unscientific practices of the humanities.  This attitude, or ethos, translates in the use of a 
stylistic device known as “style indirect libre” (McCloskey 1983, p. 9, 1994).  This way, 
economists signal that we are merely uncovering some hidden truth in the natural world 
and humbly report it for the noble sake of contributing to humankind’s knowledge.  
Economists’ reference lists are filled with unexciting titles.  Personal matters or opinions 
are not involved: economists do not talk about public schools or gender discrimination, but 
more soberly about “The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public 
Schools” (Hanushek 1986) and “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Market” 
(Oaxaca 1973).
4  The titles of the papers involved in the debate about economists echo a 
quite different attitude.  Marwell and Ames (1981) got it started with their paper 
“Economists free ride, does anyone else?” and Carter and Irons (1991) continued with 
“Are economists different, and if so, why?”.  R. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) then 
discretely asked “Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?,” but after Yezer, 
Goldfarb and Poppen (1996) intervened with “Does studying economics discourage 
cooperation?  Watch what we do, not what we say or how we play”, they reacted with “Do 
                                                 
4 Selected from the most downloaded articles from the LogEc internet site: 
http://logec.repec.org/scripts/itemstat.pl?type=redif-article;sortby=3d (accessed: May 2006).   5 
economists make bad citizens?” (R. Frank et al. 1996).  Reinhard Selten and Axel 
Ockenfels thus published a rather neutral “An experimental solidarity game” (1998), 
whereas Björn Frank and Günther Schulze wrote a working paper called: “How tempting is 
corruption? More bad news about economists” (1998), which was softened to “Does 
economics make citizens corrupt?” (2000) for publication.  Another contribution is by Frey 
and Meier, first circulated as a working paper called “Political economists are neither 
selfish nor indoctrinated” (2000), and later published as “Are political economists selfish 
and indoctrinated? Evidence from a  natural experiment” (2003), “Do business students 
make bad citizens?” (2004), and “Selfish and indoctrinated economists?” (2005).  Another 
recent contribution is “A sceptic’s comment on studying economics” by Ariel Rubinstein 
(2006). 
The titles (and texts) of the papers involved in the controversy, quite obviously, have a 
moral colour that is all but neutral.  The authors are no longer Scientists soberly reporting 
natural truths, but men who have got something that troubles them.  Moreover, while 
answering the question whether the claims of economic theory are empirically observable 
might seem like a relevant task for an economist, I remain sceptical that the same can be 
said about questions such as “are my colleagues and I selfish?”  Economists disregarded 
empirical and experimental evidence for the largest part of the history of the discipline, 
chanting aloud repeatedly Mill’s and Friedman’s gospel.  Why should we care, all of a 
sudden?  And if we decide to react to provocations of this kind, while we are at it, why 
don’t we point out that the assumptions of economic theory are (almost) respected in 
practice in a clearly defined sample of subjects (namely: us)?  If there were a general 
enthusiasm in favour of economics, we would all sit down together with economists 
teaching everyone else how to be like us!  But economics and economists are not nearly as 
beloved as we might hope. 
The very choice of a null hypotheses like <H0: economists are corrupt> betrays the 
presumption that we deserve moral assessment, and that it is fine to treat us as guinea pigs 
in order to investigate how evil we are, really.  That the problem rests with economists – 
and not more generally with professions or trainings  – is indirectly evidenced by the 
absence of a similar treatment for other categories (except, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
business students).  Though nobody seems to enjoy going to her dentist in anticipation of 
the pain dental treatments may cause, I couldn’t find any suggestion that cruel people self-
select themselves into Dentistry, or that Catholics make poor students of Biology because   6 
they are warned not to buy into the Darwinian evolutionist account, nor that students of 
Law are ignorant of basic Maths since attorneys sometimes bill their clients for many more 
hours they may possibly be alive.  As for our subject, someone proclaims that immorality 
finds its “intellectual and theoretical justification in the name of economics” (Lux 1990, p. 
129) and demand that this despicable discipline “simply be swept away” (Henderson 1981, 
quoted in Coleman 2004, p. 8n).  These are sensitive issues, and thus Rubinstein (2006, p. 
C1n) thanks the many economists who reacted to his piece, confirming that his work “hit a 
nerve.”  It is sometimes suggested that we are in the presence of a moral opinion when the 
reactions of the people involved pass a threshold on a so-called ‘emotional staircase.’ If we 
disagree about whether red wine goes with fish, the extent of our passion in defending our 
opinion against the opposing view is most likely  milder than the passion involved in a 
disagreement on paedophilia. The latter is then a moral issue vs. the former (Blackburn 
1998, p. 9ff.). 
There is something else at stake beyond intellectual curiosity. 
 
1.2. A DISPLAY OF CHARGES 
What had started as a (disregarded) epistemological investigation later turned into a trial on 
the economics profession, and eventually resulted in a moral assessment of economists.
5  A 
whole debate emerged around the selfishness of economics students in which it is 
suggested that – under numerous conditions, but not all – (1.) economics students display 
behaviour that is closer to the predictions of economic theory than other students; therefore 
(2.) all economists are more selfish people than non-economists.  What makes (2.) into 
‘bad news’ must be a belief that selfishness constitutes a violation of some social or moral 
norm.  Therefore the charges are that (3.) economics students are immoral and (4.) we, 
their teachers, are selfish and immoral like them.
6 
The implications we may draw from the charges and the room for correction depend on the 
specific interpretation of the experimental findings.  The self-selection explanation puts the 
burden of proof on the connection between selfishness and the predilection for Econ 
courses, which still needs to be advanced in a satisfactory manner.  Should this connection 
be exposed, the discipline that proves so attractive to selfish people would then be under 
                                                 
5 Carter and Irons had interpreted their findings in terms of the correspondence of economic theory with 
empirical observations in an earlier unpublished manuscript, but later dropped the issue. 
6 On the present occasion I do not question the equivalence between selfishness and immorality, but the 
equivalence can be denied in several ways.   7 
some serious suspicion; though suspicion of  what remains less obvious until the exact 
nature of such connection is understood.  For the sake of speculation:  if students chose 
their major by tossing a coin, and if by chance it happened that selfish people turn out head 
more often than tail, then it could be true that selfish people choose economics.  But do 
they choose economics because they are selfish?  And is this a bad thing? 
The training explanation, on the other hand, locates the responsibility directly on us.  It is 
us who teach our students, or give them reasons, to behave as they do.  To uphold the 
impact of training, one needs not to posit (2.) and may simply make an inference from (1.) 
to (3.).  At any rate, looking at the texts, the accusations of immorality are difficult to find 
in a straightforward sentence, and hardly ever i t is possible to read clear allegations of 
selfishness or implications thereof.  The most outspoken accusation sounds like this:  
“exposure to the self-interest model commonly used in economics alters the extent to 
which people behave in self-interested ways” (R. Frank et al. 1993, p. 159).  So, where is 
the problem?  Why the trial? 
The way in which this literature was received and commented upon by the academic 
community seems well captured by Frey and Meier’s (2000, p. 2) observation that the 
statement “economists are more selfish than other persons” is believed to be “a fact beyond 
doubt” by professional economists and probably most other scholars. 
How did everybody come to this belief? 
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
Many feel there is more to people than just greed and don’t think of themselves as 
lightning calculators of pleasures and pains (à la Veblen, 1898, p. 73).  Most of them are 
not economists, for one (or several) of the following reasons:  they are uneasy with 
extreme selfishness, do not expect self-interest to be of great importance in human 
motives, or they are not sharp-minded enough to understand the logical structure of 
economic decision-making.  Be that as it may, those who already believe men are selfish 
aesthetes pursuing the greatest satisfaction at all times or display a certain logical aptitude 
might be more likely to find their way in departments of economics (instead of, say, 
sociology or psychology) to begin with.  On the other hand, there is a possibility that 
attending too many Econ classes will eventually result in increased selfishness. 
Marwell and Ames report a total of twelve experiments aimed at assessing whether free 
riding hypotheses are a good description of the way the world works.  The research is   8 
roughly the following:  subjects are provided with an amount of tokens, which they decide 
to assign to either of two possible investments.  There is an individual investment, which is 
a private good:  each investor receives a fixed amount of money as interest for each token 
so allocated.  Alternatively there is a collective investment, which is a public good:  now 
the interest is higher, but every subject receives an equal share of it, regardless of who 
actually invested and once a minimal amount of contributions is achieved.  All the 
experiments are variants of the situation just described.  While the collectively optimal 
result obtains when everybody contributes everything to the group exchange; each player 
is better off if everyone else does, except herself.  Indeed, as mentioned,  homines 
economici contribute zero.  The authors come to reject the strong version of free riding 
(since people contribute non-negligible amounts of their initial amount of money to public 
goods), but suggest the soft version is respected (people contribute less than optimal 
amounts).  Their results are that non-economics students contribute an average of 49% of 
their starting funds, economics ones only 24%. 
Another milestone is Carter and Irons (1991, p. 171), where the authors find that “a 
behavioural difference [between economists and non-economists] does exist.”  They 
randomly recruited a sample of freshmen and senior students, both majoring in economics 
and non-economics (and not enrolled in or ever taken any graduate economics course) and 
analysed their conduct in a ultimatum bargaining game.  Here a proposer must divide a 
sum with a responder.  After the proposer makes one part for himself and one for the other 
player, the responder either agrees to the split, and it occurs as proposed; or she refuses, 
and the sum is not assigned to anyone.  Therefore, at the beginning of the game the 
experimenters asked the subjects what division of a sum of money each considered 
(un)acceptable if it were offered to them by the proposer, whence they determined each 
subject’s minimum amount acceptable as responder.  Similarly they asked the subjects to 
propose a division, whence they determined each subject’s desired amount kept.  
Economic theory would expect proposers to offer the smallest positive amount to their co-
players (e.g. 0.001%), so to keep the largest possible amount for themselves (e.g. 
99.999%).  On the other hand, responders would accept even that small share because it is 
still more than nothing.  The actual findings are as follows:  non-economists consider 
acceptable 24.4% of the original amount, and propose to keep 54.4%; economists’ figures   9 
are 17% and 61.5%.
7  We see neither amounts to the exact predictions of economic theory, 
but economists get closer.  The reason appears to be that it is the most selfish students who 
choose to undergo training in economics, while less selfish ones find their way elsewhere, 
because freshmen majoring in economics are already more selfish than non-economists.  
“Economists are born, not made” (ibid., p. 174). 
Elaborating on this point, R. Frank et al. (1993, R. Frank 2004) assembled groups of three 
students from different backgrounds and have them play two simultaneous one-shot 
prisoner dilemmas, with real money as payoff and confidentiality about their game conduct 
(enforced through the addition or subtraction of a random amount to/from actual payoffs).  
In such situation individuals face a decision where a choice always yields a higher payoff 
(i.e. it’s a dominant strategy), but which – when made by all players – results in a poorer 
outcome for each participant than she would have achieved if everybody chose otherwise.  
Although cooperation is advantageous for both parties, economic theory has it clear that 
every rational agent will defect in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma.  Defection rates are 
60.4% for economists and 38.8% for non-economists.  Once again it is the economics 
student who gets closest to the behaviour predicted by economic theorists. 
The game, however, is about  self only to some extent, because the payoff is also 
determined by the behaviour of others.  It is likely that the choice to defect or cooperate 
depends on one’s expectations of the behaviour of one’s partner and, to be sure, the only 
way to confront a defector is to defect.  The more one advances in economics training, the 
more one expects others to be dishonest and therefore, probably, to defect.
8  The progress 
of non-economics education reveals a marked reduction in defection responses, by contrast 
“the trend towards lower defection rates is virtually absent from economics majors” (R. 
Frank et al. 1993, p. 168) suggesting that “the training in economics plays some causal role 
in the lower observed cooperation rates of economists.” 
Altogether it appears that Steven Rhoads (1985, pp. 162-163) was correct in commenting, 
much earlier than these experiments were conducted, that “[p]eople who think […] narrow 
self-interest makes sense are more likely to become economists.  Through their training 
economists learn that they and their discipline can be more powerful  if […] self-interest 
                                                 
7 In this experiment the initial amount is 10$ and “any division is permissible as long as the two amounts are 
in multiples of 0.50$ and sum to 10$” (Carter and Irons 1991, p. 172), so that the minimum positive amount 
offered is 5% of the total. 
8 This is tested by asking whether the owner of a small firm would report a mistakenly smaller bill for the 
goods he bought, whether a person finding an addressed-envelope containing cash would return it, and what 
would the subjects do in the same situations (Frank et al. 1993, pp. 168ff.).   10 
matter even more than they first thought.”  But it could be expected that not everybody 
would react easily to the accusation of being a selfish person.  Indeed some economists 
began to argue that the alleged selfishness of economics students was not granted, and 
conjured experimental evidence that contradicts earlier results.  To be sure, economics 
students’ behaviour deviates from that of the others, but in ways that are not always 
consistent or easily predictable. 
 
2.1. THE ECONOMIST AS EVERYONE ELSE 
However nasty and indoctrinated economists might be supposed to be, there must be some 
principles in their nature, which interest them in the fortune of others.  By surveying 
university professors in a range of disciplines R. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) 
investigated their donations to charity, their participation in presidential elections, and their 
contributions to voluntary work (i.e. public goods).
9  R. Frank (2004, pp. 164-5) then made 
income estimates for professors in different disciplines and at different seniority levels, and 
calculated an average level of generosity for the sample.  Professors of Economics 
contribute about 91% of the expected amount for their income, while Professors of Art, 
Architecture, and Music give 73%, a nd Professors of Natural Sciences give 119%.  
Economists even rank slightly above average in the number of hours spent in voluntary 
activities.  In a vast investigation about the actual payment of Professional Associations 
membership fees, Laband and Beil  (1999) notice how economists free ride less than 
sociologists or political scientists.
10  Frey and Meier (2000) also demonstrate that students 
of (political and business) economics are about as selfish as students of law, but much less 
so than medical and v eterinary students; the most selfish are students of business 
administration.  Interestingly, they do so not with an experiment, but by evaluating actual 
spontaneous contributions to two social funds:  the one granting cheap loans to needy 
students, the other supporting foreigners willing to study at the University of Zurich, where 
the data were gathered. 
What seems to be the strongest defence of economists comes from a lost-letter experiment 
(Yezer et al. 1996).  Cash-filled envelopes with an incomplete address were disseminated 
in classrooms right before courses took place.  Half of the these were Econ, half non-Econ 
                                                 
9 The data reported here are from Frank (2004, ch.9) but they refer to the same source presented earlier, i.e. 
Frank et al. (1993). 
10 Though they then interpret these results in a way that affords the conclusion that there is no real difference 
between economists, sociologists, and political scientists. See the discussion in Laband and Beil (1999, pp. 
98ff)   11 
courses.  Therefore 64 randomly recruited and unaware subjects took part in the 
experiment.  Surprisingly, almost 44% of the subjects managed to forward the envelopes to 
unknown recipients, and this often required substantial effort: in order to send the letter, 
the subjects had to look up for the complete address to which money had to be forwarded 
(corresponding, of course, to an associate of  the authors).  Of the successfully returned 
letters, 56% came from Econ classrooms, and only 31% from non-Econ ones. 
Once again, the evidence is not interpreted as an indication that economic theory – which 
predicts a rational agent would not return the letter – is mistaken.  The main result of the 
public goods and lost letter-experiments is that economics students are as selfish as others, 
or even  less selfish than others.  When put together with the findings discussed above, 
there appears to be enough evidence to deem economists selfish people and – incidentally 
– also enough to deem them not so.  There is an apparent problem with this ambiguity.  
What do these experiments show? 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE 
It surely has to be proved that the kind of evidence referred to in the literature represents 
the best (or even an appropriate) tool for investigating questions of human morality and 
decision making at large.  Experimental design and response measurement vary, so that 
some are possibly better than o thers.  On the whole, however, the main reason for 
arranging experiments is to stabilize certain variables in a replicable and context-
independent manner (i.e. approximating ceteris paribus conditions) so that one or more 
other variables can be studied in isolation.  In this way internal validity is established, or 
the guarantee that the choice context is essentially equal and constant for all subjects.  The 
kind of control one may exercise on the observations, moreover, varies greatly depending 
on the procedure employed.  Lab results, for instance, originate in “a highly controlled, 
very abstract, experimental situation” (Marwell and Ames 1981, p. 296).  Precisely for this 
reason, Yezer et al. (1996) are very critical of certain experiments, while R. Frank et al. 
(1996, p. 189) praise them for the “opportunity to control incentives to a degree that cannot 
be matched in natural experiments” and because these incentives “closely mimic [those] 
found in naturally occurring social dilemmas.”  If the main advantage of natural 
experiments is that subjects face the actual, and sometimes substantial, consequences of 
their choices, the main disadvantage is indeed that the experimenter does not select the 
type, degree, and extent of any treatment and she does not decide when and where the   12 
treatment should occur (Harrison 2004).  On the other hand, field experiments (Harrison 
and List 2003) complicate lab experiments with some elements from the settings in which 
economic decisions are naturally made (e.g. naturally occurring commodities instead of 
tokens or subjects from the field instead of students), but they also import additional noise 
from the outside.  So it is not always straightforward in what ways different procedures 
affect the quality of experimental output, both in terms of its internal and its external 
validity. 
In defence of their results, some experimenters underline that participants in lab 
experiments take their involvement “very seriously” (R. Frank et al. 1996, p. 189), whereas 
another traditional critique of experimental methods concerns surveys (Boulier and 
Goldfarb 1998, McCloskey 1983) and it suggests that people are sometimes unaware of 
their beliefs or do simply have no incentive to disclose them, so that they cannot or will not 
respond correctly.  A seeming solution would be to introduce a relevant and salient reward, 
and of which experimental subjects wish to obtain as much as possible – typically money – 
in order to empower the experimenter to ‘induce value’ into experimental choices (V. 
Smith 1976).  Because “subject’s behaviours  are direct results of the instructions and 
reward systems,” induced valuations play out in such a way that “experiments were 
revealing a lot about [the experimenter’s] own beliefs and very little about [his] subjects’ 
properties other than obedience” (Starbuck 1993, p.76). 
Other methodological concerns of experimental research at large also play a role in this 
context.  Every experimental enterprise is subject to the problem of theory-ladeness of 
data, i.e. one’s theoretical priors affect the type of elicited observations (Kuhn 1962).  By 
emphasising the common behaviour of economics students, for instance, these researches 
implicitly rule out the possibility that each individual is autonomous in his decision-
making and that the higher or lower proportion of cooperators in a population might be 
entirely accidental.  In a similar way, groups of economists are contrasted with rather 
heterogeneous and indistinct groups of non-economists, as if there were some pretence that 
these two types of groups compose the whole of society and that non-economists were all 
the same (R. Frank et al. 1996 complain against Yezer et al. 1996 that students of Biology 
are trained with principles of natural selection founded on self-regarding behaviour that do 
not distinguish them sufficiently from Economics students to serve as control group).
11 
                                                 
11 Furthermore economics programs can be very different in content, teaching methods, and career prospects 
(more on this below), and many other Social Sciences programs may include classes in economics.   13 
On the other hand, there is a related problem of under-determination of theories by data, 
i.e. data alone cannot prove a theory (Quine 1951).  To mention one example, the results 
from R. Frank et al. (1993), because 60% of the economists defect, are enough to push the 
authors to answer the question whether economists make bad citizens.  Depending on how 
one frames the issue – e.g. by saying that 40% of the economists cooperate – the results 
can also be taken as evidence that human beings are not very selfish.  Laszlo Zsolnai 
(2004, pp. 40-41) indicates this experiment as one of five “famous studies [… suggesting] 
that people are moral beings in their economic actions.” 
Another general problem with experiments is that different studies may have specific 
shortcomings (e.g. number and composition of subjects, control groups, statistical tests, 
assessment of relevance…).
12  It is also noteworthy that individual experimenters do affect 
the output of their studies.  For instance, Marwell and Ames (1981, p. 304) interpret a 
datum closer to their hypothesis as “probably more accurate, as it reflects the responses of 
subjects interviewed by more experienced interviewers.”  Whether this consideration casts 
a shadow on the reliability of the whole enterprise remains an open question.  At any rate, 
results from different disciplines (economics, psychology, sociology) stem from 
fundamentally diverse ways to conceive, conduct, and interpret experiments.  Because in 
each experimental design the conditions that are kept constant differ (often significantly), 
and each set-up elicits the observation of different variables, therefore, findings across 
experiments are not directly comparable and because experiments can be used in a variety 
of ways in the pursuit of a variety of goals, the interpretation of experimental results 
remains likely to stimulate debate and to be open to contrasting views.  It seems therefore 
legitimate to put these experiments side by side because they all amount to advancing a 
portrait of economists.  These portraits, however, are not uncontroversial, which brings us 
to the issue of external validity. 
Nobody would go through the troubles of setting up an experiment, incur the effort and 
costs of analysing data from multiple pre-tests, and paying numerous subjects, if all he can 
claim at the end of the day is that twenty-three out of thirty of his subjects defect under 
such and such manipulation.  Experimenters believe that their subjects are representative of 
some population and behave in a way roughly similar to everybody else, so that their 
                                                 
12 For instance, Marwell and Ames compare the conduct of graduate students of economics with that of high 
school students. The two groups differ in many respects and it is plausible that many causes are accountable 
for differences in their behaviour.   14 
results are externally valid and can be generalised to the whole of the target population.  Is 
this the case of the moral trial as well? 
In order to answer, one must fist find out who or what is an economist. 
 
3.1. WHO ARE THE INDICTED? 
This much we know: economists are professionals, as witnessed for instance by a plurality 
of economic professional associations worldwide.  Because the profession is not regulated 
like that of lawyers and engineers, for which there exist educational requirements and 
official licensing, it is much more difficult to establish when one officially joins its ranks.  
As professionals, economists possess specialised knowledge, and this knowledge could 
serve as the basis on which to separate us from other professionals and from the lay public.  
Though a coherent and comprehensive definition of the subject matter of our discipline 
may be very hard to come by, there are two acceptable approximations.  The traditional 
one calls economics the science which studies the production, distribution, and 
consumption of goods and services, in other words what we roughly identify as the 
‘economy.’  A more recent account is as “the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 1932, p. 15), in 
other words decision-making.  Since it may be very difficult to tinker about a professional 
description that revolves around the analysis of choice under scarcity, I will restrict myself 
to the first definition for the time being.  But also to distinguish economists from non-
economists based on our knowledge of the economy or of human choices is anywhere 
between a thankless task and a mockery.  It is thankless because other social scientists also 
investigate what markets and the economy are, as all the people involved in the business 
world do, journalists as well have very well formed and often persuasive opinions, and lay 
people in general have a solid grasp of what Deirdre McCloskey (1990) calls ‘ersatz 
economics’ and Paul Rubin (2003) calls ‘folk economics’.  And they all seem to disagree 
with economists, all the time. 
The obvious reason why this is the case is that we know better than they, and one might try 
and tell economists apart based on our strongly held belief, indeed certitude, that we 
possess better knowledge of the economy than others… until one clashes with the boasts of 
entrepreneurs, consultants, and stockbrokers, whose skill to ‘read’ the economy makes 
their sixth senses tickle right before a certain bubble is about to pop or a certain stock go   15 
through the roof, whereas economists had no clue about that.  They obviously ought to 
believe they know better.  Therefore, alas, this criterion fails as well. 
What about real knowledge?  Perhaps economists stand out thanks to the kind of stuff that 
big name professors write in the papers that pave their ways to the Nobel Committee.  This 
criterion would work quite well if economists agreed on many fundamental facts and 
truths.  But we don’t.  That by Arjo Klamer (2007) is an accurate description of the 
discipline as a bunch of ongoing, parallel and separate, conversations.  For instance, 
several Keyenesian, Post-Keynesian, and Monetarists made it to the top of the profession, 
and from those heights they kept disagreeing with each other (e.g. Klamer 1983).  In truth 
one can be an influential and respected economist from a top-notch university and share 
nothing with another influential and respected economist from a top-notch university 
except the name of the Department they are affiliated with.  It has even been suggested, 
and this has become a sadly well known joke, that economics is the only science in which 
two people can earn the Nobel Prize for saying opposite things or even share a Nobel Prize 
for saying opposite things – e.g. Gunnar Myrdal and Friedrich von Hayek in 1974, and 
more recently Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith.  Not even profound knowledge is the 
right place in which to look. 
Perhaps, more simply, it is the training we have undergone.  Klamer calculates that 
American colleges count no less than a million undergraduates who take courses in 
economics every year and that 30,000 of them select it as their major.  Moreover, there are 
17,500 Economics Ph.D.’s around.  Where should one set the threshold?  A single 
introductory course, most of the times compulsory, seems hardly enough to make someone 
into an economist, especially if this person ends up majoring in a completely different 
subject.  In some sectors of the American government it is enough to have taken four or 
more courses in economics to be considered an economist, but one can obtain the 
qualification through training in statistics, applied mathematics, or finance, so that the 
exact type of training one has received needs not be especially consistent or homogeneous.  
Majoring in economics, on the other hand, may make a relevant standard.  An Econ major 
must undergo introductory and intermediate theory courses and several electives in applied 
or specialised fields, and this could just do the change from layperson into economist.  
Equipped with the right training and the right degree, these young men (and some women) 
walk out of college in their full capacity as economists.  But this capacity does not seem to 
last very long.   16 
After the growth in the ranks during the 70’s, the numbers have been going steadily down, 
somewhere around 30% for majors and 18% for doctorates, and the Ph.D.’s rapidly leave 
the country after graduation, signalling that many of them are foreigners (Siegfried 1998).  
Fewer than half majors continue their education beyond the Bachelor, and only about 3% 
pursue an advanced degree in the same field, while many move on to Law or Business 
School, therefore becoming lawyers or business analysts.  Very few graduates call 
themselves “economists” when they enter a job (Siegfried et al. 1991, p. 198).  Quite soon, 
therefore, the majority of candidates for the label ‘economist’ do not qualify anymore. 
Furthermore the Econ-major criterion may seem inadequate because it would leave out 
many professionals employed as economists.   The 2002 Survey of Earned Doctorates 
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago suggests 
that historically only just above 55% recipients of Ph.D.’s in Economics and Econometrics 
come from bachelors in the same field (it peaked at 62.2% in the early 80’s).  But even a 
doctorate does not necessarily make a crucial distinction since many economists, including 
several prominent ones, did not use to and to this day they often do not receive any formal 
training in economics. 
 
Perhaps, therefore, one could look into occupations.  The U.S. Bureau of Labour (2007) 
estimates 13,000 practitioners of economics are active in the U.S. alone.  (The figure is not 
impressive for a country in which every year over 30,000 students major in the field.)  
Also, what exactly is the job of an economist?  We variously work in the public 
administration, in politics, in international organizations, in public and private research 
institutes, in different types of teaching engagements, in consulting firms, in the media, … 
(Coats 1981, 1986, 1989, Frey 2000, Mandel 1999).  Most of the economists, however, 
still consider the academia as our privileged career (TABLE 1).  After the graduation, some 
Economics doctors look at the government and not-for-profit, and more and more of us 
TABLE 1. Postdoctoral Plans 
 
  1960/64  1970/74  1980/84  1995/99  2000 
College/University  59.4%  65.0%  56.5%  43.1%  42.5% 
Industry/Business  6.0%  5.8%  10.8%  16.9%  18.6% 
Government  9.0%  11.5%  13.6%  11.5%  12.8% 
Nonprofit  4.0%  3.9%  3.3%  3.0%  4.2% 
Postdoctoral study  -  3.8%  4.4%  7.0%  6.6% 
Source: Scott and Siegfried (2002, selected entries)   17 
seek employment in the private sector, but the majority still seeks a research and teaching 
position in a college or university.  Although it is obviously a limited and biased sample, 
one could argue that academic economists are appropriately representative of the 
profession. 
 
3.1.1. – ALL ECONOMISTS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL 
Now that some ground has been cleared towards an acceptable definition of the 
economists’ target population, it is possible to proceed in the assessment of the Moral 
Trial, and more specifically of its indicted with respect to the incriminating evidence. 
The whole idea of a Moral Trial must rest on the presumption that different people choose 
different professions because of individual differences of some kind.  There is some 
evidence supporting this intuition:  different personalities indeed help predict different 
study choices and different degrees of rationality in the choice process.  This very 
evidence, however, poses an additional challenge to the trial against economists.  
Christopher Boone, Woody van Olffen, and Nadine Roijakkers (2004, p. 67) found that 
different personalities are associated with four different educational choices: Economics, 
Business Administration, Business Education, and International Economics and Business 
Studies.
13  These four could be presumed quite similar types of students, and one could 
easily group them together as economists-in-training, depending on which definition of the 
profession one embraces.  One would not be surprised to see them labelled economists and 
contrasted with non-economists in experiments such as those reviewed above, although 
they are evidently heterogeneous.  There are possibly yet larger differences between these 
groups and groups of students in disciplines such as Chemistry, Literature, Psychology, 
and Fine Arts, but such evidence is still missing. 
The subject samples in the experiments mentioned above reflect the difficulties of 
satisfactorily define who is an economist.  They included, for instance: first year graduate 
students of Economics (Marwell and Ames 1981); “freshmen economists, who had 
declared economics as their major and were enrolled in the first-semester macroeconomics 
course” (Carter and Irons 1991, p. 171) but were never taught microeconomics (p. 176); 
professors chosen at random from professional directories, economics majors and 
                                                 
13 As often is the case with studies of this kind, Boone et al. (2004) do not study whether people with a given 
personality choose business rather than economics. It tests whether people who have chosen it have a given 
personality. Different responses in personality tests may be at least in part a consequence of the major one 
has chosen, and not entirely pre-existing.   18 
nonmajors, and students enrolled in an upper division public finance course at Cornell 
(Frank et al. 1993); “upper-level economics classes (that is, courses beyond the two-
semester principle of economics sequence)” (Yezer et al. 1996, p. 180); “students of 
economics, and economic pedagogy or agricultural economics” (B. Frank and Schultze 
2000, p. 105).  Another paper, by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) reports findings 
from a Ultimatum Game that commerce students (i.e. business students in the Canadian 
university system) were more likely than psychology students to make one-sided offers. 
The choice of subjects sample is problematic also in terms of its heterogeneity: high school 
students self-select themselves into Econ majors, are thus trained in economics, then they 
self-select themselves into graduate students and are again trained, then some of these self-
select themselves into teaching economics.  The type of self-selection and the type of 
training should be different at each stage.  It is not clear whether the contribution to social 
funds by graduate economics students can be immediately compared with the split 
proposed by freshmen in a Ultimatum Game and with self-reported participation in 
presidential elections by professors.  Furthermore, R. Frank’s (2004) and Laband and 
Beil’s (1999) observations that actual professors of economics are no more selfish than 
professors of other subjects make it hard to purport that the experiments address 
economists’ morality at large.  Regardless of the attempts to establish this conclusion, it is 
not economists and economics teachers who are selfish: it is our students.  The implication 
that these students eventually become economics professors does not seem to be probable 
nor compelling enough to accuse us of selfishness, unless we also posit some sort of 
ceteris paribus clause.  In other words we must imply that that people never change, so 
that there is no significant difference between twenty years old students and fifty years old 
professors.  I doubt such assumption can be safely made, in the face of contrary evidence. 
To be sure, it is questionable whether first year undergraduate students of economics 
behave in a way comparable to that of fifty years old economists.  But it is also 
questionable whether older economists would make a better choice:  being wealthier, they 
would not react to the promise of winning a few dollar bills and the arrangement of 
meaningful incentives for the sample would make the experiment much more expensive; 
or they might even refuse to waste their time taking part in an experiment.  These are very 
much pragmatic concerns, whose importance must not be underestimated (especially in the 
light of the tight constraints of research grants and because economics journals reject ipso 
facto experimental papers without an adequate induced value).  But they should not be   19 
overemphasised either.  A more severe problem would be that, being experienced, grown-
up economists often assume a more nuanced stance towards the experiment and behave in 
a more sophisticated way, so that the results would be less obvious.
14 
Econ students, on the other hand, seem to be reasonably good subjects because they are 
informed to the economic way of thinking in a clear-cut fashion and still react to the 
incentives to behave accordingly.  They are also less likely to be distracted by the attempt 
to understand the underlying goal of the experiment, but to simply focus on the task that is 
required of them and to thus respond in a way that is more sincere or at least less 
concerned with the implications t hat could be drawn from their responses (demand 
effects).  All these remarks seem to boil down to one: economics students make better 
subjects to show economists selfish because actual economists would not behave selfishly 
enough for being accused of selfishness. 
How bad would such failure be? 
Absolutely indifferent, if one wants to explore an empirical phenomenon, but very bad, if 
one wants to advance a moral charge against the profession. 
 
3.2. H0: <THE CHARGE IS UNCLEAR> 
Another difficulty in assessing this literature is that claims such as: ‘economists are more 
selfish than non-economists’ are problematic.  What does being more selfish than others 
mean? 
First of all, in order to draw meaningful insights from experimental evidence, we must 
accept the conjecture that a selfishly motivated person will free-ride in the provision of a 
public good, make and accept stingy offers in ultimatum games, defect in prisoner’s 
dilemmas, be dishonest when he finds a cash-filled letter and avoid contributing to charity; 
conversely, we must accept that someone who behaves like this is motivated by self-
interest.
15  Though all these conducts are arguably compatible with self-interest, it does not 
follow that they are motivated (only) by self-interest.  And useful though it is in certain 
theoretical settings to assume self-interest as the sole motivation of human behaviour, the 
assumption is inadequate to address empirical questions about individual behaviour across 
a range of only marginally similar circumstances.  Under such  assumption, the only 
question that could be meaningfully addressed is how many subjects behave irrationally.  
                                                 
14 For instance, practicing economists predicted the contributions in the Marwell and Ames experiment to be 
in the range of 30%. 
15 I overlook these implications on the present occasion.   20 
The authors involved in the moral trial, therefore, do not subscribe to the assumption, if 
only because it would deny the grounds for their very experiments, and for the whole 
debate. 
Unqualified claims, also, make the concept of self-interest hard to pinpoint.
16  From the 
ultimatum game experiment one can derive the following behavioural implications of self-
interested motivation: 
HIGH REQUEST: an economist pursues large individual gains (e.g. makes 
smaller offers); 
LOW ACCEPTANCE:  an economist pursues small individual gains (e.g. 
accepts smaller offers).
17 
Taken as general claims about self-interest, within a behaviourist framework where self-
interest is the only motivation, the two are contradictory.  If we observe someone who 
accepts a small offer, we must conclude that he wants little money; conversely, if we 
observe the same person making a small offer, we must posit that he wants a lot of money: 
these are their revealed preferences.  I do not see any good reason to embrace such 
theoretical perspective on this occasion, because that would put a serious challenge on the 
attempt to suggest that economists are more selfish than others when they accept less 
money than others. 
To be sure one can think about revealed preferences in connection with opportunity costs, 
so that accepting a small offer basically means wanting as much money as possible, 
because the only alternative available – rejection  – equals zero payoff.  And the two 
observed manifestations of self-interest can be made sense of simply noting that there is no 
contradiction in wanting a lot, but being willing to accept very little.  One could argue that 
HIGH REQUEST comes first, but  LOW ACCEPTANCE is better than nothing.  But, if we are 
willing to walk away with very little, in a situation of sufficient uncertainty, we should also 
be prepared to offer a huge share of the initial amount, possibly up to 99% of it in order to 
keep at least 1%.  I frankly doubt that this would in fact ever happen (or, for that matter, 
that on the present occasion it makes sense to employ a theoretical approach which admits 
such behaviour).  It seems, therefore, that the ultimate challenge of the experimental 
findings presented above is to explain why an economics student behaves as a homo 
                                                 
16 On this occasion I do not elaborate on the different ways in which it is possible to conceive of self-interest 
(e.g. egoism, selfishness, non-tuism, etc.). 
17 HIGH REQUEST and LOW ACCEPTANCE portray economists’ conduct in the prisoner’s dilemma and the public 
good games as well.   21 
economicus, under the assumption that he is not one.  It is thus puzzling how most 
commentators agree that best explanation is that he is a homo economicus, after all (self-
selection). 
The extent of self-interest is not the only aspect worth mentioning: its frequency is also a 
matter of investigation in the literature.  Self-interested behaviour in ultimatum games and 
public goods investments can be of differing degrees.  But in a prisoner dilemma a player 
cannot defect more than another, she can only defect more or less often.  One way to cash 
out the ‘more selfish’ charge could thus be through a claim of 
FREQUENCY: an economics student behaves selfishly more often than a 
non-economics one. 
The FREQUENCY charge, however, is not addressed by the experiments and seems to be 
altogether un-testable.  It is possible to design numerous experiments in which economists 
behave more selfishly than non-economists, but it is also possible to design numerous 
experiments wherein the vice versa is true.  A frequency claim would be very difficult to 
ground in empirical observations.  It is not enough to observe that, in the majority of a 
handful of experiments conducted to-date, economists and economics students of various 
kinds behave more selfishly than non-economics ones.  Comparatively, to be sure, one 
may say that Sarah is more selfish than Michael, if Sarah behaves selfishly in certain 
situations in which Michael does not.  The question is not strictly speaking one about the 
number of occasions in which one behaves selfishly, but about types of situations.  There 
are situations in which it is morally acceptable to behave in a self-interested manner (e.g. 
market exchange).  What matters is thus the subjective perception of a situation by the 
agent.  To prove economics students more selfish, one must make the case that economics 
and non-economics students perceive a certain situation as identical and that yet they 
behave differently. This is a very s trong hypothesis, even for money-rewarded 
experiments. 
At any rate, one should not rush to conclude that any specific individual can be confidently 
expected to act in a way comparable to the aggregate behaviour of experimental subjects. 
A subject could answer A rather than B because he misunderstood the question, made a 
mistake, copied from his neighbour, was contacted by a more experienced interviewer….  
Only at the aggregate level, the results of experiments appear to meaningfully uncover new 
phenomena inaccessible to theoretical analysis alone.  Sentences like ‘economists are more 
selfish’ or ‘economists  are less cooperative,’ which abound in the literature, are   22 
catchphrases to convey the gist of the trial:  they are somewhat correct, but quite 
inaccurate.  We need a qualification: 
LIKELIHOOD: economics students are more likely to behave selfishly than 
non-economics ones. 
It can be proposed that a sentence like ‘economists are more selfish than non economists’ 
boils down to a statement about the likelihood that someone does something.  Claims of 
this kind are very common in the literature.  For instance, several commentators (B. Frank 
and Schulze 2000, p. 110; R. Frank 2004, p. 160 and p. 164; Yezer et al. 1996, pp. 184-5, 
italics added) suggests that economics students are “more likely” to make one-sided offers.  
But such claim does not go deep enough explaining why they make such offers to ensure 
predictive accuracy, nor to advance a serious moral charge. 
The LIKELIHOOD qualification, however, is not a statistical statement proper: it does not 
mean that in one hundred repetitions of the same prisoner dilemma, an economics student 
defects 60% of the times.  It makes a claim about individuals (and not about a population) 
by evoking concepts like dispositions, inclinations, tendencies….  Indeed, R. Frank (2004, 
p. 160, italics added) seems to produce a synonym to ‘more likely’ when he suggests that 
economics students “ tend to behave less cooperatively.”  Because the evidence we are 
discussing refers to groups, it prevents us from drawing conclusions about single subjects 
and it also undermines the possibility to address the morality of individual economists.  On 
the grounds of the evidence, we are not entitled to translating the charge on the population 
into a charge on individual economics students, e.g. by saying that economists share a 
tendency to behave selfishly.  The little-advertised observations that 40% of the economics 
students cooperate in the prisoner dilemma (R. Frank et al. 1996) and that 40% propose the 
50-50 split in the Ultimatum Game (Carter and Irons 1991, p. 177) do not per se deny this 
inclination.  One may have a disposition to conduct selfishly, but some other tendency may 
prevail and prevent one from pursuing a selfish act.  For example, one may have the 
inclination to cooperate in social dilemmas except when one expects defection.  If this 
person always expects defection, she will never cooperate despite a tendency to do so.  
There is no specific evidence suggesting economics students do have any peculiar 
tendency in the first place. 
To advance a claim about individual tendencies from the existing evidence we need to test 
several additional hypotheses: for instance that individuals who make the same decision in 
a game are similarly motivated, and that similar motivation in a given context (assuming   23 
again it is perceived to be identical by economics and non-economics students) is 
associated with the same personality – a selfish one, in this case.  We then want to undergo 
at least a rough inquiry into what makes a selfish personality, maybe a character trait (i.e. 
selfishness) or some other psychological dimension (e.g. locus of control).  All these 
reflections may suggest a different interpretation of the charge: 
PREDOMINANCE: there is a higher number of selfish individuals among 
economics students than among non-economics ones. 
The  PREDOMINANCE  connotation solves the problem of targeting a group instead of 
individuals and it captures the charges typically moved against economics  – as the 
discipline towards which selfish people converge.  The PREDOMINANCE proposition does 
not immediately follow from  LIKELIHOOD, and it requires – at the very minimum – that 
people can be meaningfully called selfish.  It seems to be taken for granted that they can.  
But do economics students have the trait of selfishness?  Or, even, is it possible for them to 
have that trait? 
 
3.2.1. – ALL ECONOMISTS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL (2) 
To have a character trait amounts to being disposed to act in a consistent and reliable 
manner in most (or even all) the circumstances that elicit the trait in question, “even if 
those circumstances vary widely in their particular situational details” (Miller 2003, p. 
375).  Character traits are therefore broad based, long-term, and stable dispositions to act in 
a distinctive way.  They also have a causal/explanatory function in that we say that a 
selfish person behaves selfishly in a self-interest-eliciting situation precisely because she is 
selfish. 
Several findings from social psychological research demonstrated that character traits 
alone do not explain all behaviour, also situational factors affect individual conduct to a 
large extent (e.g. Allport 1966, Bowers 1973).  They even suggest that the common 
practice of attributing character traits to people is misguided.
18  For instance, Darley and 
Batson (1973) designed an experiment to uncover the major moral characteristics 
underlying the behaviour of the Good Samaritan.  The subjects were students at Princeton 
Theological Seminary instructed to go to another building to give a talk.  On their way to 
give the talk, subjects encountered a ‘victim’ slumped in a doorway.  Only one variable 
predicted whether the subjects stopped to help: how late they were.  63% of the subjects 
                                                 
18 Such allegation would be a Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross 1977).   24 
who were in no hurry, 45% of those in a moderate hurry, and 10% of those who were in a 
great hurry stopped.  (It did not matter whether they were asked to talk about the very 
parable of the Good Samaritan, nor which were their moral and religious orientations.)  
Another example is the famous study on obedience (Milgram 1974a) showing that 65% of 
the subjects, instructed to punish a person characterised as a ‘learner’ whenever he failed to 
answer correctly, went on administering powerful electric shocks that appeared to be 
lethal.  One subject thus commented:  “So he’s dead.  I did my job!” (Milgram 1974b, p. 
88). 
Unless we are ready to believe that the majority of the population have the traits of a 
murderer, we must interpret social psychological experiments like the two reported above 
as evidence that behaviour is substantially influenced by environmental factors and that 
character traits do not exist.  Whence two implications usually stem:  they can still be 
employed for explanatory or predictive purposes or they should be eliminated as a 
misguided illusion.  Neither would be enough to sustain a moral charge of any seriousness.  
On the other hand, it may be conceded (Miller 2003, pp. 381-388) that there exist ‘local 
character traits,’ which are activated in connection with narrowly defined situations of a 
certain kind.  This leaves the open question of whether a narrowly defined situation might 
encompass both playing a prisoner dilemma and choosing a major.  More specifically, it 
hinges on the presumption that defecting in a prisoner dilemma should be somehow 
associated with studying economics.  It is admittedly the case that two distinct, narrowly 
defined, situations might activate the same local character trait.  But such case has not been 
convincingly advanced as of yet.
19 
To make a significant case for self-selection in connection with the alleged selfishness of 
economists, one must assume that economics students have some disposition to be selfish 
and that they stick to such disposition across all situations.  Alternatively, and  more 
plausibly, one has to make the case that the conditions encountered in the experiments – 
e.g. ultimatum games – are to a large extent comparable to everyday situations, so that 
subjects’ behaviour in the experiments can be generalised to a broad range of human 
actions.  A yet narrower, but still sufficient, basis would be to show that the game 
                                                 
19 Gandal and Roccas (2002) and Gandal et al. (2005) go in this direction by drawing a connection between 
individual and professional values.   25 
theoretical settings reproduce the central features of the decision between economics and 
other majors.
20 
This latter suggestion, however, calls for a spelling out of what self-selection amounts to.  
Why does a selfish person choose economics?  Perhaps he expects to make a good 
investment on himself and eventually become wealthy.  But such is hardly the case: 
doctors in economics are on average 32 years old and can expect to earn anywhere 
between U$ 63,000 and U$ 81,000, as (tenure or tenure-track) assistant professors.  
Moreover, the U.S. Department of Labour in its 2006/07 Occupational Outlook Handbook 
signals as the most noteworthy features of the profession the  “slower than average job 
growth.”  The real incomes, moreover, have declined by almost 5% between 1987 and 
1995 (Siegfried and Stock 1999, p. 132).  They have declined even more in comparison 
with the wages commanded by Law and Business school graduates.  Upon graduating from 
one of the top-10 MBA programs in America, which happens on average at 27, one may 
expect to earn a yearly salary in excess of U$ 130,000.  The typical graduate walks out of 
one of the top-10 American Law schools to earn U$ 125,000 per year.
21  According to 
Ronald Ehrenberg (1999, p. 137ff.), the relative income of economists has also declined in 
comparison with professionals in fields such as entertainment and sports.  Put bluntly, if 
we are in Economics for the money, we certainly possess a large degree of idiocy to top up 
our greed. 
Perhaps, there are alternative perks that make the choice of an academic career more 
appealing than better paying alternatives.  One can think of intellectual stimulation (in 
economics?) or individual freedom to pursue one’s interests (at some distant stage down 
the career path), but these are present (possibly in greater supply) in other fields as well.  
Maybe a selfish person would feel more at ease in a discipline that does not condemn 
selfishness (but there exist other fields in which selfish people are not necessarily 
disparaged.)  Maybe such a person would find it easier to learn economics. 
Is it for some other reason?  For more than one reason?   
                                                 
20 The classical interpretation of game theory is precisely that games capture the physical and institutional 
features of real world situations. But this is not what happens in practice. Instead, the theorist invents the 
rules of the game as he sees fit (Janssen 1998, p. 23). A game is thus not a full description of the elements of 
a situation, but rather a description of “the relevant factors involved in a specific situation as perceived by the 
players” (Rubinstein 1991, p. 917). Even in a strictly controlled lab experiment, the payoff cannot capture all 
the relevant factors for all players. 
21 MBA data from Financial Times: http://rankings.ft.com/global-mba-rankings (accessed: july 2007). Law 
School figure is form  http://www.ilrg.com/rankings/law/median.php/1/desc/MSPrivate08 (accessed: july 
2007). Economics data are from Scott and Siegfried (2007).   26 
In spite of the broad empirical support for the self-selection explanation, any deepening or 
in fact any description of whatever self-selection amounts to or of however it plays out is 
lacking.  Moreover, what would be the moral implications (both about the person and 
about the discipline at large) of each reason? 
At any rate, even the identification of a more punctual self-selection effect would not 
entirely solve the issue.  Would we still be entitled to believing economics students more 
selfish than others, if non-economics students selfishly chose law or biology because they 
expect to make a better career out of these majors, or because they believe these majors 
require less effort of them? 
After showing that economics students behave more selfishly than non-economics ones in 
a given experimental setting, the ‘accuse’ suggests that this difference is constant and that 
economists are by nature more selfish.  But some experiments cast reasonable doubts on 
such conclusion.  In certain settings, economists behave like others or even less selfishly.  
The ‘defence’ thus calls economists innocent.  What they could further claim, however, is 
that much of the trial is (as of yet) ungrounded. 
 
4. A SOCRATIC PROBLEM IN ECONOMICS 
Self-selection has been so far identified as the soundest explanation for economics 
students’  behaviour.  Carter and Irons say this is all there is.  Frey and Meier find 
indications of self-selection in business students, who emerge as the selfish people in their 
experiment.  Also R. Frank and his colleagues recognize strong indications of self-
selection, while claiming a role for training as well.  Training, on the other hand, is more 
contested.  Carter and Irons find no conclusive traces of it, nor do Frey and Meier.  But the 
existence of a training effect is crucial to make a case against economics.  If we do not 
have any impact on our students, why bother us?  What are we guilty of?  And what are we 
supposed to do to change the situation? 
From the observation that (1.) economics students display behaviour that is closer to the 
predictions of economic theory than other students it has been inferred that (2.) economists 
are selfish people.  As discussed above, this claim has to face the burden of social 
psychological research that questions the existence of character traits like selfishness and 
the soundness of an inference of selfish personality from observed behaviour.  Also very 
weak is the suggestion that (3.) economics students are immoral, until one makes a 
compelling case that defection in a Prisoner’s Dilemma is coextensive with immorality   27 
(i.e. that under all possible understandings of the payoff structure, defection always 
violates the tenets of morality and that it is always morally inferior to cooperation).  And 
the further implication that economists are (4.) immoral like them since we used to be 
students would also be speculative.  It is not based on empirical observations, and it is 
actually at odds with several findings.  Perhaps there is a ‘temporary’ divergence in the 
behaviour of those students who major in economics.  But they eventually, as it were, go 
back on track.  Economics professors are largely like professors in other disciplines. 
Economists may be like everyone else because we know how abstract the assumptions of 
our theory are, and we know that the world is very complex instead.  We know that 
assuming strangers to cooperate with us in prisoner dilemmas is unlikely to make us fit for 
a competitive world.
22  We also know that our lives require acts of generosity and altruism 
(though we believe that such acts make no difference in the definition of market prices).  
Maybe it would be a good teaching technique to share all the qualifications with our 
students, but we prefer to pass on neat, rigorous, and clear-cut lessons.  This is not without 
reasons; nor without consequences.  Even if we resist the charges (1.)-(4.), therefore, there 
may still be room to complain that (5.) we are dangerous because we make our students 
selfish, and consequently that (6.) we are immoral for the danger we represent, so that 
economics becomes the stage for a case of what we may call a Socratic Problem.
23 
One of the accusations that lead Socrates to his death sentence was that of being a 
corruptor of the young because his most prominent students – Critias and Alcibiades – 
became a violent oligarch and a traitor of the polis respectively.  The extent to which the 
Socratic Problem involves the teacher-student relationship in economics is thus dependent 
on the extent to which the social disapproval of students’ behaviour follows from the 
doctrines economists teach and from the social disapproval of the content of these 
doctrines. 
Do we economists, too, corrupt our students? 
Among a variety of accusations against Socrates, Eric Schliesser identifies some 
arguments that easily transfer to the moral trial against economists:  Socrates’ teachings 
and example potentially threatened the state’s constitutional order, and he taught his 
students methods and doctrines that did not respect the established social and constitutional 
practices.  These methods and doctrines, in immoderate hands, can lead to immoral 
                                                 
22 But this might be, at least in part, economics’ own fault (e.g. Ferraro et al. 2005). 
23 I appropriate the terminology of Socratic Problem from Eric Schliesser (personal communication, but also 
e.g. 2006a, 2006b).   28 
practices.  We can rewrite these reflections as follows: economists’ teachings and example 
potentially threaten the state’s constitutional order (which often requires cooperative 
behaviour and mutual trust), and we teach our students methods and doctrines that do not 
respect the established social and constitutional practices (because selfishness violates 
some social norms).  These methods and doctrines, in immoderate hands, can lead to 
immoral practices (e.g. the case of the so-called ‘Chicago Boys,’ those Chilean graduates 
from Chicago who became economic advisers to the Pinochet regime, see Schliesser 
2006b).  The conclusion is that “Socrates’ impact on his students endangers the polity” 
(Schliesser 2006a, p. 5).   Again, replace Socrates with economists to appreciate the 
conclusion.  Elinor Ostrom (1998, p. 18) presages that “we are producing generations of 
cynical citizens with little trust in one another, much less in their government.  Given the 
central role of trust in solving social dilemmas, we may be creating the very conditions that 
undermine our democratic ways of life.”  This is not only worrisome: it is scary. 
Our students might blindly and faithfully submit to economic knowledge, and develop 
‘economic intuition.’  They might then employ such intuition naïvely, without due 
judgement.  They might try to imitate the smart homo economicus, without realising that 
he is just a fiction, a representative description of the sufficient individual conditions for 
achieving a certain equilibrium, which in practice is instead attained by a bunch of non-
necessarily-selfish, imperfectly rational human beings.  But our students are not taught 
this, or not clearly enough.  Our students are taught highly formalised techniques for 
explaining ‘why what they predicted did not happen,’ as the joke goes. 
Robert Solow has been quoted as commenting that “[t]o say something is wrong with 
graduate education is to say that something is wrong with the economics profession” 
(Klamer and Colander 1990, p. 18).  He was referring to the results of the extensive 
investigation of graduate education in economics at the top American universities 
conducted by David Colander and Arjo Klamer (1987).  That research focused on the 
content of economics training, and revealed a growing separation of economics from the 
real world.  ‘Having a thorough knowledge of the economy’ was considered the least 
important factor in guaranteeing one’s success as an economist.  The top-3 aces up one’s 
sleeve were believed to be ‘being smart in the sense of being good at problem solving,’ 
‘excellence in mathematics,’ ‘being very knowledgeable about one particular field.’ 
The situation does not seem to have changed much (Colander 2003).  To see its practical 
consequences, we may turn to a recent experiment by Rubinstein (2006).  The subjects   29 
wear the shoes of a Vice-President of a company facing a recession and must decide the 
number of workers to be laid off.  Rubinstein shows that economics students aim for profit 
maximisation more decidedly than non-economics ones.  In an alternative treatment he 
also shows that, when the problem is presented mathematically (i.e. as a function to be 
maximised), students majoring in economics, business, and mathematics all make almost 
identical choices – i.e. they maximise profits.  For the economics students the difference 
between the two treatments is small.  It is almost as if, even in the absence of the formula, 
economics students did construct the problem mathematically, as a somewhat abstract 
cost-benefit calculation. Rubinstein (ibid., p. C8) thus proposes a warning about the risk 
that “presenting a problem mathematically, as we often do in economics, conceals the real-
life complexity of the situation.”  His research was indeed “motivated by [his] concern 
about the way economics is currently being taught” (p. C1).  Our students do not “study 
economics,” instead they become “experts in mathematical manipulations.”
24  And he does 
nothing to hide his intent to “encourage [the readers] to consider changing [economists’] 
teaching methods” (p. C9).  The encouragement is not solitary:  a related suggestion – to 
change the content of economics teaching – came from R. Frank and colleagues (1996, p. 
191). 
I’m afraid we do not yet have a thorough enough understanding of the differences between 
economists and non-economists, and of the reasons for such differences, for us to change 
economics in a significant way, because, persuaded though I am that the methods and 
content of economics teaching are ripe for improvement, I must also recognize that 
Hirschleifer (1994) and Yezer and colleagues (1996) have a point when they emphasise 
that economics already includes crucial lessons on the importance of mutual satisfaction 
and voluntary exchanges.  Nonetheless, the methodological, psychological, and logical 
complaints I advanced are not nearly enough (nor do they try) to call economists innocent.  
More evidence is required to resolve the present hypotheses, and several additional 
hypotheses need testing.  From these, one may find reasons to sustain different charges and 




                                                 
24 Rubinstein (2006, p. C1) also suspects that our students’ views on economic issues are ‘influenced by the 
way we teach, perhaps without them even realising it.’ But Klamer and Colander (1990, p. 59ff.) interviewed 
many students who revealed they were perfectly aware of what was going on at graduate schools.   30 
4.1. IS THERE A SOCRATIC PROBLEM? (AND, IF SO, IS IT A PROBLEM?) 
It is not conclusively clear – though there are some indications – that economics training is 
responsible for changing behaviour.  Our classes may indeed make our students behave 
selfishly in certain situations in which other students do not.  One way in which this effect 
seems to manifest itself is by inducing ‘cynical’ expectations about others (R. Frank et al. 
1993).  When we play a game, or when we make a real-life decision, our expectations of 
other people’s conduct matter very much.  For instance, when we expect our partners to 
defect we defect, too.  On this specific type of training effect, however, we should suspend 
our judgement.  Firstly, because it is yet to be demonstrated that cynical expectations make 
economics students ‘bad citizens.’  Secondly, because this is a phenomenon observed 
elsewhere.  For one instance, the majority of Dutch taxpayers say they pay taxes as a 
contribution to the common good.  They believe, however, that the majority of others pay 
taxes only to avoid legal troubles (Andreoni et al. 1998).  Cynical expectations may be a 
prerogative of Econ students when it comes to game-theoretical experiments, but not on 
more mundane occasions. 
The observed behavioural differences between economists and non economists remain a 
riddle that eludes our understanding for which several explanations can be proposed.
25  
One explanation is that Econ classes generate cynical expectations about others (R. Frank 
et al. 1993).  When we play a game, or when we make a real-life decision, our expectations 
of other people’s conduct matter very much.  When we expect our partners to defect we 
defect, too.  Beside the beliefs about who and how others are, also our self-image, or who 
and how we think we are, matters a great deal in decision-making.  For instance, graduate 
students in economics do not consider employment in a private company (Stigler 1959) 
and those available to teach at some good liberal arts college or to take up a position in a 
governmental agency do not openly admit to it (Klamer and Colander 1990).  This is not to 
deny the virtues of private enterprise and civil service.  Simply, econ PhD’s (ought to) 
want to do research at high profile universities.  In a quite similar way the imaginary vice-
presents in Rubinstein’s experiment responded differently from the way they would have 
(presumably) responded in a scenario in which they wear the shoes of Labour Union 
representatives.
26  Another effect of Economics might thus come about by means of 
                                                 
25 One possibility on which I do not elaborate is that the least selfish students of economics pursue an 
academic career. 
26 This may be an example of how certain institutions modify individual perceptions of meaning and 
appropriateness, and therefore tastes (Danzau and North 1994, Hodgson 2003).   31 
altering our self-image, and this may occur very fast.  There exists consistent evidence that 
the mere wording of experimental instructions alter the subjects’ dispositions towards 
someone, towards some choice, or towards the process of making a decision; and they 
remain largely unaware that this happens.  Because the descriptions are not given in 
advance, they modify players’ conduct in a very short time.  Upon enrolling, therefore, one 
may be instantly changed:  first-week Econ students are indeed already different from non-
Econ ones, if only to the extent that they are… well, Econ students.  Being an Econ student 
comes together with a stereotypical image of a selfish person.
27  Besides the rather intuitive 
remark that stereotypes cannot do full justice to actual individuals, they nonetheless shape 
expectations, because institutions also affect the perceptions that others have about their 
members.  If you always defect with me because I am an economist – and I know that you 
do – I defect in return.  When I play with another economist, I again defect, just as you 
would.  There may thus exist an  identity effect that explains why Econ students behave 
much like economists from the very first days of their enrolment, by means of imitating 
some stereotypical image they hold (Lanteri and Rizzello 2007).
28  The larger the identity 
effect, it seems, the less the need to invoke self-selection (though the two are not 
incompatible explanations). 
Afterwards, with the beginning of courses, a  priming effect might enter the picture, 
connected with the repeated exposure to economics concepts, but this eventually fades 
away after graduation. 
Over the course of more formal training, moreover, there should arise a specific way in 
which economists understand and interpret situations – what we may call a framing effect 
(Lanteri 2007).  Several textbooks of microeconomics (e.g. Frank’s Microeconomic and 
Behaviour, 2005, back cover, emphasis mine) try to “help students develop  economic 
intuition.”  How do they accomplish that?  By encouraging “the reader to develop the 
distinctive mindset known as thinking like an economist.”  Therefore, they routinely 
feature a Section or an entire Chapter devoted to the economic way of thinking.  In an 
extensive commentary on the economics major in American universities, John Siegfried 
and his colleagues (1991, p. 199) confirm that “broad consensus exists among economics 
faculty that enabling students to ‘think like an economist’ is the overarching goal of 
                                                 
27 The moral trial, by means of reinforcing the image of the economist as a selfish person, might actually 
worsen this problem instead of solving it. 
28 This is the reverse of R. Frank and colleague’s training effect: it refers to the cynical expectations other 
people have about economists.   32 
economics education.”
29  Recently, an economics textbook (Arnold 2004) even took the 
title of How to Think like an Economist. 
But how does an economist think? 
The European edition of Robert Frank and Ben Bernanke’s introductory textbook, 
Principles of Economics, is more explicit.  The book engages the students “to see each 
feature of their economic landscape as the reflection of an implicit or explicit cost-benefit 
calculation” (McDowell et al. 2006, back cover, emphasis mine). 
When we reason in terms of cost-benefit, trade-offs, or relative prices it is both more likely 
and more socially accepted to enact self-serving behaviour.
30  This would not make us 
different from others in terms of how we behave strictly speaking, but in terms of how do 
we think of a situation.
31  Our behaviour is then properly attuned to such perception. 
Both the priming and the framing effects mentioned above are outcomes of economics 
training.  Priming seems to be temporary – that is, to last as long as the priming is repeated.  
This might explain why economists return ‘normal’ after they complete their training.  If 
this is the case, long-term risks associated with the exposure to self-interest rhetoric in 
Econ classes might be negligible.  The framing effect instead can be presumed to be long-
lasting.
32  But there is nothing unique about this phenomenon: it is part and parcel of the 
functioning of human brain and it is a consequence of training, learning, and expertise 
acquisition (e.g. Chase and Simon 1973 on chess players, Moss et al. 2006 on engineering 
students and references therein).  The acquisition of expertise in a domain is associated 
with specific ‘knowledge structures:’ both the content of expertise and its structure are 
characteristic of each particular domain, and it influences “how things in the world are 
perceived and categorized” (Moss et al. 2006, p. 66).  In other words, it produces the 
economist’s way of thinking.  Alternatively, it could have produced the engineer’s or the 
historian’s way of thinking.  It is also likely that such way of thinking reflects both on the 
self-image of and the stereotypes held about economists.  Is our way of thinking worse?  Is 
                                                 
29 “All other virtues follow,” they further remark. 
30 But even if behaving selfishly in market-like situations is acceptable, it might be not acceptable to always 
treat a situation as being market-like (Lanteri 2006). 
31 When one thinks of a situation as market-like, one presumably also believes, in that situation, pricing to be 
an adequate and fair allocation system. For an investigation of whether economics students like pricing more 
than non-economics ones, see Frey et al. (1993). 
32 A repetition of Rubinstein’s (2006) experiment with the readers of a business magazine shows that readers 
with an economics background differ from those with a non-economics one, but their tendency to 
maximisation is much weaker than in the students’ sample.   33 
it morally inferior to others?  Though speculations on this matter are not lacking, 
convincing evidence is yet to be produced. 
Even if economics training had no effect whatsoever on our students and selfish people 
were simply born that way, one must also question whether for these selfish people to 
choose economics is a morally condemnable choice.  What would be the risks of having 
economists do something else?  What makes a selfish person a good citizen:  that he 
becomes an economist or a social worker, a nurse, a civil servant…?  Maybe, by luring 
these people into economics, we are serving a larger social goal. 
I do not think, in the face of the existing evidence, that the moral trial should have major 
consequences on the economics profession as a whole, nor on economics teaching.  Or, 
more specifically, not yet.  It may be true that we induce selfish behaviour (with a huge list 
of qualifications due) in our students.  But this effect appears to largely wear off with time.  
In the meanwhile, to be sure, they may earn a reputation of nastiness, which would harm 
them forever, but I doubt that this case can be seriously advanced. 
Neither do I think that everything is fine with economics and economics teaching.  Far 
from it.  My feeling is that we should worry, but not too much, about how bad citizens our 
graduates turn out to be.  What seems to me much more shameful and ethically 
troublesome is the massive investment in technical expertise that shields our students from 
the exploration and the understanding of real-world phenomena.  In my opinion, the moral 
trial suggests that, as a by-product of econ education, we induce them to endorse a line of 
conduct that they will (hopefully) abandon later on.  Hardly a worthy accomplishment. 
   34 
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